Johnston v. Long by Traynor, Roger J.
University of California, Hastings College of the Law
UC Hastings Scholarship Repository




Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions
This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Honorable Roger J. Traynor Collection at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Opinions by an authorized administrator of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact marcusc@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Roger J. Traynor, Johnston v. Long 30 Cal.2d 54 (1947).
Available at: http://repository.uchastings.edu/traynor_opinions/236
60 JOHNSTON 11. LoNG (30C.2d 
thereof, the court may authorize the executor or adminiR-
trator to continue the operation of the decedent's business 
to such an extent and subject to such restrictions as may 
seem to the court to be for the best interest of the estate 
and those interested therein." 
[2] Defendant contends that since an executor authorized 
under this section to operate a decedent's business no longer 
does so at his own risk, he is not liable for torts committed 
in the course of business operations when he is free from 
fault, and that to construe the section otherwise would im-
pose too heavy a burden on executors who must operate busi-
nesses. This contention overlooks not only the fact that the 
executor is not required to operate the business, but must 
petition the court for permission to do so, but the fact that 
the rule as to the personal liability of an executor for torts 
committed during the course of his administration is not con-
fined to cases in which the executor carries on operations that 
are outside the scope of his authority. (See Nickals v. Stan-
uy, nprG; RGpGporl v. Forer, nprG; 44 A.L.R. 637, 640') 
Personal liability for torts committed during operations that 
are otherwise within the proper scope of the executor's au-
thority is not a new burden. There is nothing in section 572 
to indicate that any change in the rule as to personal liability 
was intended. The principal effect of the 1929 amendment 
was to provide an authorization, should the will fail to pro-
vide one, for the executor to carry on the decedent'. busi-
ness. (EstGfe of Ward, nprG; EsfGte of King, 19 Ca1.2d 
354, 359 [121 P.2d 716].) 
Defendant also contends that the rule of respOMBGt supe-
rior cannot be applied against an administrator or executor 
who gains no personal advantage from the operation of a 
decedent's business. In making this contention, defendant 
relies on Campbell v. Bra.dbury, 179 Cal. 364,371 [176 P. 
685] and J'effing v. Winch, 54 Ore. 660, 607 [104 P. 722, 
21 Ann.Caa. 352, 38 L.R.A.N.S. 379]. In Campbell v. BrfUl.. 
bury, this court held that an incompetent under guardianship 
was responsible for the negligent operation of an elevator in 
a building operated under the control of the guardian and 
rejected expressly any analogy to the liability of executors 
in similar situations. A judgment imposing liability on an 
incompetent to be paid out of assets controlled by a guardian 
is clearly distinguishable from a judgment imposing liability 
on an estate. The incompetent is a person and would still 
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be liable after the discharge 01' removal of the guardian, but 
the estate is not even a legal person and after distribution 
of the assets and discharge of the executor it no longer exists. 
The court in the Campbell case had someone before it upon 
whom the liability could be imposed, and there is some jus-
tification for avoiding circuity of action by imposing the lia-
bility initial1y on the party that would ultimately bear it 
even if the guardian were personally liable. The answer to 
this problem by the Oregon court in Fetting v. Winch, aupra, 
solves nothing except that a plaintiff would have no right 
of recovery, no matter how just his case. In the Fetting case, 
although the estate was still open, the court held that the 
executor could be held in neither his individual nor his 
representative capacity. He was not individually liable be-
cause not personal1y negligent, and the estate was not liable 
because it could not commit a tort. 
With regard to obligations incurred in tl.le operation of 
businesses under section 572, it has been held that while the 
administration continues, contractual obligations are properly 
chargeable against the estate but do not become liens on the 
assets of the estate. (Estate of Allen, 42 Cal.App.2d 346. 
348 [l08 P.2d 973]; Estate of Smith, 16 Cal.App.2d 239. 
241 [60 P.2d 574].) Defendant relies, however, on California 
Employment Stab. Com. v. Hansen, 69 Cal.App.2d 757, 770 
[160 P.2d 173], in which the court stated that the obliga-
tions incurred in managing the decedent's business pursuant 
to section 572 are charges against. the estate and that after 
a final decree of distribution the executor is not liable for 
contributions under the Unemployment Insurance Act when 
the claimant has failed to file a creditor's claim against the 
estate. Not only was that case concerned with the construc-
tion of the Unemployment Insurance Act, but there was no 
issue of fault on the part of the executor. Nor is it applicable 
if the plaintiff has no provable and liquidated claim against 
either the executor or the estate at the time the estate is closed. 
[3] Under the doctrine of respondeat auperior, except 
where the rule may have been changed by statute, torts com-
mitted by employees of a trustee in the course of administra-
tion of the trust estate subject the trustee to persona1liability. 
(Rest., Trust, § 264, comment (b); cases collected, 3 (pt. 2) 
Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, 532; 2 Scott on Trusts, § 264; 
43 Harv.L.Rev. 1122, 1124.) Most cases have recognized 
! 
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that the same rules determine the personal liability of an 
executor for torts committed in the course of administration. 
(See Kirchner v. Muller, 280 N.Y. 23, 28 [19 N.E.2d 665, 
127 A.L.R. 681); Clauson v. Stull, 331 Pa. 101, 103 [200 A. 
593]; cases collected 43 Dick L.Rev. 143; 44 A.L.R. 637. 640: 
3 (pt. 2) Bogert. op. cit. supra, 533.) Except for the Oregon 
ease of li'etti""g v. Winch, supra, the cases hold that the doe· 
trine of resptmdeat superior is applicable to an executo!' 
and that he is personally liable for the torts of employees. 
(Fisher v. McNeeley, 110 Wash. 283, 284 (188 P. 4'78, 14 
LL.R. 369]; Gatti-Mcquade Co. v. Flyn"", 79 Misc. 430. 431 
[140 N.Y.S. 135]; Kalua v. Camari""os, 11 Hawaii 557. 558; 
see Bogert, Zoc. cit. supra.) 
The rule of personal liability of a trustee or executor for 
the torts of his agents in the course of administration is now 
generally qualified by giving the executor or trustee a right 
to reimbursement against the assets of the estate when he is 
personally without fault. (Rest., Trusts, § 247; cases col-
lected 3 (pt. 2) Bogert, op. cit. supra, § 734; Scott, op. cit. 
supra, § 247; 44 A.L.R. 637. 676.) The restatement also pro· 
vides that when the claim against the trustee is uncollectible 
because his personal assets are insufticient, the plaintiff may 
reach the trust assets to the extent that the trustee would 
have had a right of reimbursement. (Rest .• Trust. § 268: 
see, also, Scott on Trusts, § 268; Stone, A Thetw1J of Liabilify 
of Trust Estates for the COfI.tracts and Toris of the Trustee, 
22 Columb.L.Rev. 527.) A few cases have gone further and 
allowed the trustee to be used in his representative capacity 
in order to avoid circuity of action. (In re Raybould (1900). 
1 Ch. 199, 201; Ewifl.g v. Wm. L. Foley, Inc., 115 Tex. 222, 
234 [280 S.W. 499. 44 A.L.R. 627]; contra, Kirch""er v. Mul-
ler, supra.) None of these authorities, however, holds that the 
trustee is absolved from personal liability (see Stone, toc. cit. 
supra), and it is elear that any right of action that the plain. 
tiff has against the estate is purely a derivative one. ['1 When the executor carries on the decedent's business I with proper authorization. there is no doubt that contractual 
obligations properly incurred are chargeable against the 
estate and that tort liability, where the executor is not per-
sonally at fault. should ultimately be home by the estate. If 
section 572 has any effect on the question of tort liability of 
the estate, the purpose of that section as well as the pUl'Pose 
of any authorization in the will for the ea.rrying on of the 
) 
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business may be fully carried out by applying the rules 
of the Restatement of Trusts in regard to such liability as 
well as the representative's rights of reimbursement out of 
the assets of the estate. 
[5] It has been contended, however, that the doctrine of 
respondeat superior should apply directly against the execu-
tor in his representative capacity and not subject him to per-
sonal liability when he is without fault. Although this precise 
question has never previously been decided by the California 
courts, there are good reasons for not departing from the gen-
eral rule. To hold the estate rather than the executor pri-
marily liable for the torts of the agents of the estate, it would 
be necessary to apply the rules governing the liabilities of a 
corporate office!" and to abandon those governing a trustee, 
which have heretofore been held applicable to executors. It 
is clear that an offieer of a corporation is not liable under the 
doctrine of respondeat superior for the torts of corporate em-
ployees except where the officer is at fault. The liability falls 
upon the corporation. Unlike a corporation, however, an 
estate is not a legal or corporate entity (Tanner v. Best, 40 
Cal.App.2d 442, 444 [104 P.2d 1084]) and cannot be a prin-
cipal. [6] Nor can the executor properly be regarded as 
the agent of the heirs or distributees, for his authority is 
derived from the will. and the control that is exercised over 
him is the control exercised by the probate court. (Eustace v. 
Jahns, 38 Cal. 3, 22.) His position is more nearly that of a 
trustee or of the decedent himself than that of an agent. The 
employees are thus regarded as his employees and his liability 
for their actions should be that of any employer. (Kalua v. 
Camarinos. 11 Hawaii 557, 558.) 
[7] Moreover. even if it be assumed possible by some 
procedure to hold the estate directly liable for the torts of 
employee.q without any right against the executor personally, 
where the executor is not personally at fault, there are prac-
tical objectiorm to such a procedure. Under the existing sys-
tem of administration such a procedure would not afford the 
heirs adequate protection. The only method available for 
reaching the assets of the e.crtate is an action against the execu-
tor in his representative capacity. (Golden Gate Undertak-
ing Co. v. Taylor: 168 Cal. 94, 99 r141 P. 822, Ann.Cas. 1915D 
742, 52 hR.A.N.S. 1152]; Tanner v. Best, supra.) If the plain-
tiff could recover directly from the estate in an action against 
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the executor in his representative capacity, the heirs would 
have no assurance that the question of the personal fault 
of the executor would be properly tried. It would not be to 
the interest of either the plaintiff. who would be attempting 
to recover out of the assets of the estate, or the defendant, 
whose interest as an individual and as an executor would be 
in con1lict (see KirchMr v. Muller. 280 N.Y. 23. 28 [19 
N.E.2d 665, 127 A.L.R. 681]), to show personal fault on the 
part of the executor. Under the general rule that the execu. 
tor is personally liable for the torts committed by him or his 
agents in the course of administration, the plaintiff may r&-
cover a judgment against the executor personally and the 
question of the executor's fault is determined in the probate 
court, where the interest of the heirs may properly be pro.. 
tected. (See Atkinson on Wills, 611.) 
It is contended that this application of the respondeat 
superior doctrine may have harsh results if the executor is 
not able to recover against the estate and his own property 
is !fIlbject to execution under the judgment. Ordinarily, if 
the executor is without fault he is protected by his right of 
reimbursement out of the assets of the estate. Moreover, this 
application of the doctrine of respondeat superior is no 
harsher than its usual application to a principal who may 
gain no profit from the actions of his agent (Silva v. Provi-
dence Hospital, 14 Cal.2d 762. 775 [97 P.2d 7981) and there 
is no estate from which he can get reimbursement. The prin. 
cipal justification for the application of the doctrine of re-
8pcmdeat superior in any ease is the fact that the employer may 
spread the risk through insurance and carry the cost thereof 
as part of his costs of doing business. (See Smith. Frolic and 
Detour, 23 Columb.L.Rev. 444. 456 et seq.) Under the broad 
power granted to the probate court under section 572 of the 
Probate Code, the court may require. as a condition to the 
right to continue decedent's business, the executor to insure 
against any tort liability arising out of the conduct of the 
business, with the premiums for such insurance payable out 
of the assets of the estate as a proper expense of the business. 
[8] In the present ease, even if there were either a direct 
or derivative right against the executor in his representative 
capacity, defendant Long could not be held liable in that 
capacity, for he was no longer an executor and there was no 
estate for 1Um w represent at the time of the suit. The pur-
) 
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pose of such a suit is to !'each thl:! assets of the estate under 
the executor'p control. (GoMen Gate Undertaking Co. v. 
Taylor, supra; see Sterret v. Barker, 119 Cal. 492, 494 [51 
P. 695].) Where the executor has been discharged and the 
estate diRtributed. the executor ill therefore no longer RUbject 
to RUit in his representative capacity. (Union Satlings Bank 
v. De Laveaga, 150 Cal. 395. 398 [89 P. 84].) There would 
be no purpose in mch a suit. for the executor bas no assets 
of the estate under hil'l control. 
(9] Similarly. after an executor bas been removed, his 
connection with the estate is severed and a judgment against 
him doe.'~ not bind the estate. (J/ore v. More, 127 Cal. 460, 
462 f59 P. 8231.) 
[10] In thifl case. therefore. the plaintiff could proceed 
directly against the assetfil of the estat.e only by suing the 
diRtributee. Thill action wall originally instituted against the 
distributee as well as a~ainst the executo1'8, but a demurrer 
was sustained without leave to amend. and a judgment, which 
has now become final. wall entered in favor of the distributee. 
Since the distrihutee is not a party to thill appeal. it cannot 
be decided in this ('.aBe whether the executor has a right of 
indemnity againm the distributee to the extent of the as.qets 
distrihuted. (See Rest., Trusts. §§ 249(2) and 279 for t.he 
restatement rules as to the tru.qtee'R right of indemnity after 
distribution and the derivative rightA of a tort plaintiff.) 
[11] The suggestion that a plaint.iff Flhould have onl:v a 
direct. right against the diRtributee after an estate haFl heen 
closed and the assetR distribut.ed is completely Ull.omppol'ted 
by authoriiy. Moreover, such a rule would impose a con-
siderable burden on the plaintiff in a case in which the assetA 
are widely distributed among many legatees. who may all be 
residents of other juril'ldjctions and have no property within 
thiq state. There are not. therefore. sufficient reasons for de-
viating from the general rule of pe1'8onal liability of the execu-
tor for the tort.Q of himself and his agentR in the course of 
adminiortration. and it is clear t.hat in closing the estate an 
executor does not thereby cut off his pe1'8onal liability for 
such torts 
[1J] Althol1~h oefendant Long could have been held per-
sonally liahle for the injuries sustained by the plaintift' in 
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trial on the issue of his personaJ liability. The theory of 
the plaintiff's case against defendant was that he was a 
business invitee on the premises operated by the defendant 
and that the falling of the door was caused either by the 
negligence of an employee of the garage in repairing the 
door or by the failure of the garage employees to discover 
a dangerous condition that might have been discovered by 
reasonable inspection. Although there was some conflict in 
the evidence as to plainti1l"s right to be on . the premises at 
the time of the accident and as to his right to operate the 
door, there was substantial evidence to support the conclu-
sion that his status was that of a busines..~ invitee and that 
he had the right to open the door. 
The basis for the theory that the accident occurred because 
of the negligence of an employee in repairing the door was 
the failure of an employee named Budhi, the building super-
intendent, to have a nut welded on the end of the wire cable. 
The cable was replaced shortly before the accident (the exact 
date was never established), by a carpenter employed by the 
codefendant, the San Diego Planing Mill Company. This 
carpenter, who had also iriginally installed the door, testified 
that he did not tie the end of the wire cable to prevent it 
from unwinding, as required by the instructions that came 
with the original hardware. There was, therefore, sufficient 
evidence to warrant an inference that the cable became dill. 
connected because of unwinding of the cable. The carpenter 
testi1ied that he did not tie the cable because at the time of 
the original installation Budhi had had a nut welded to the 
end of the cable, and on replacing the cable the carpenter 
understood that this welding was to be done again. There 
was evidence to the effect that such welding tended to weaken 
the cable and that, for this reason, it was not done on similar 
doors in San Diego. Budhi testi1ied that he did not have any-
thing done to the door because the carpenter informed him 
that it was unnecessary. This testimony was corroborated 
by another witness. There was therefore so1Bcient evidence 
upon which the jury might have concluded that the accident : 
was caused by the negligence of the employees of either of 
the defendants or of neither. (See J ohmton 'f. Long, 56 Cal. 
App.2d 834, 837 [133 P.2d 409], for the law of the ease 
88 to the liability of the defendant planing mm.) 
The other ground on which defendant may have been held i 
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to use reasonable care to discover a condition that involved an 
unreasonable risk of harm to those using the door. (Rest., 
Torts, § 343; Barbieri v. Law, 209 Cal. 429, 433 [287 P. 
464] .) The end!l of the cable were not properly tied, and the 
evidence WWI sufficient to warrant an inference that this con· 
dition was the cause of the cable's becoming unfastened. 
Although there was evidence that the accident might not 
have happened had plaintiff opened the door in a proper 
manner. the questions of causation and of contributory neg· 
ligence were submitted to the jury under proper instruc~ 
tions, and there is substantial evidence that a reasonable 
inspection would have disclosed 8 condition involving an 
unreasonable risk . of harm to anyone operating the door. 
[13] Defendant contends that the court erred in giv-
ing the follo,ving instruction: 
"It was the duty of the defendant Ralph C. Long, to use 
ordinary care and diligence in keeping in repair the meehan· . 
ism and appliances maintained by said defendant for the use 
of the passageway, and if you find from a consideration of 
all the evidence that the accident resulting in the injuries to 
plaintiff occurred by reason of a defect in said mechanism, or 
appliances, and find that such defect either was known or, 
by the exercise of reasonable care, should have been known to 
the defendant Ralph C. Long, prior to the happening of the 
accident then you will find said Ralph C. Long to have been 
negligent with reference thereto, and if you further find 
that. without negligence on the part of plaintiff, such negli. 
genee was a proximate cause of the accident in question, your 
verdict will be in favor of the plaintiff and against the de· 
fendant Ralph C. Long." 
It is defendant's position that since this instruction does 
not mention the status of the plaintiff, the jury was instructed 
that as a matter of law Long was liable whether or not the 
jury concluded that plaintiff was an invitee. There is no 
merit whatever in this contention, for the instruction com-
plained of was read to the jury along with the instructions 
on the question of plaintiff's status. The paragraph immedi-
ately preceding the foregoing quotation makes it clear that 
the instruction complained. of· was given to the jury with 
reference to plaintiff's duty to a business invitee. Two sen· 
tence..~ above the matter quoted the court stated, "you are 
instructed that where one as an i1tvitee is lawfully using an 
entry or passageway. he is not required to employ any ex· 
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traordinary degree of care or circumspection for the ascer· 
tainment of whether or not the entry or passageway is safe." 
(Italics added.) The sentence immediately preceding the 
challenged instruction explains that a business invitee. if not 
himself negligent, has a right to rely on the presumption that 
the passageway is maintained in a proper and safe condition. 
The instruction complained of then goes on to explain the 
defendant's duty to such an invitee. 
Following the paragraph complained of, the trial court 
again referred to the duties of the defendant to an invitee. 
The next paragraph makes clear what the jury was told by 
these instructions. It reads as follows: 
"You will note that there are two questions to consider in 
connection with whether plaintiff received injuries as a result 
of lack of care on the part of the proprietor or proprietors of 
said building. The first question is with reference to his 
status upon the premises and he must prove that he was an. 
invitee in order to establish that he was a person toward whom 
reasonable care must be exercised. It is then to be deter-
mined whether it has been established that the proprietor of 
said premises failed to use ordinary care or negligently failed 
to use ordinary care and whether such negligence was the 
proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries." (Italics added.) 
[14] Defendant also contends that the court held as a 
matter of law that defendant was the proprietor of the busi. 
ness. The instructions continue, however, as follows: "It is. 
therefore, an essential element of plaintiff's cause of action 
against the defendant. Ralph C. Long. to establish by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the defendant, Ralph C. 
Long, was a proprietor of said building." (Italics added.l 
Following this instruction there is an instruction that Long 
is not liable as an executor. The rule of respondeat S'Uperior 
is then explained to the jury. There was clearly no errol' in 
referring to defendant as a proprietor oi the business. for, 
as an executor authorized to run the business, he wa..q liable 
as the proprietor. 
[15] The second instruction complained of by defendant 
reads as follows: "You are instructed that if the defendant 
Ralph C. Long by and through his officers or agents, requested 
the defendant Planing Mill Company to repair the door. and 
if tke evidence establishes that said Long paid therefor, then 
the law imputes to said Long knowledge of the condition and 
necessity of repair." (Italics added.) Petitioner contends 
) 
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that by this instl'liction, the triaJ court, in effect, "instructed 
the jury, as a matter of law, that if a bill was rendered for 
the repain upon the door and was paid by long the full 
knowledge of the condition was imputed to Long as a matter 
of law." The instruction, however, merely informed the jury 
that Long was liable for the acts of his agents under the doc-
trine of respondeat superior and that their knowledge of the 
condition of the door at the time of the repain was imputed 
. to him. By paying the bill for the repairs, Long merely 
ratified the agency in getting the repairs done. In any event. 
defendant Long, as an executor of the estate authorized to 
run the business, W&!1 liable for the negligencp. of the em-
ployees of the estate in regard to the condition of the door. 
Whether or not he paid the bill himself was therefore imma-
terial. For this reason the instruction was at most irrelevant 
and could not have been prejudicial. 
[16] Defendant also contends that the court erred in 
refusing to give the fol1owing instruction requested by de-
fendant Long: 
"In considering the question of whether a person enter-
ing the premises of another is an invitee, you are instructed 
that a person . entering premises or having authority to 
enter premises for busineBll purposes becomes an invitee in 
the premises to the extent reasonably necessary for· carrying 
on the business purposes. The fact, however, that a penon 
is such an invitee does not make him an invitee to all parts 
of the premises, nor does it make him an invitee for the 
purpose of using any and al1 appliances that may be on 
the premises. In such instance he is an invitee only to the 
extent reasonably to be expected in connection with the 
business purposes for which he is invited to enter the prem-
ises. Such invitation implies the right to enter such portions 
of the premises and to make use of su~h appliances there-
for as are reasonably to be expected in connection with the 
purpose of the invitation but no further." 
Defendant makes the following concession in his opening 
brief: "It has been at all times conceded that for the pur--
pose of delivering gasoline· he [plaintiff] was an invitee." 
Defendant's only claim of error, therefore, is that the jury 
was not properly instructed as to the scope of the invitation 
and as to the burden of proof thereon. The questions of 
fact for the jury, as heretofore stated, involved plaintiff's 
right to be on the premises at the time of the accident 
/ 
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and his right to operate the door. The instructions given 
by the trial court presented these issues to the jury, and 
the jury was properly instructed in regard to the burden 
of proof. Therefore the trial court did not err in refusing 
defendant'!! requested instruction. 
The court instructed the jury as to the status of an in-
vitee in the following terms: 
"One who goes upon the premises of another as a business 
visitor at the express or implied invitation of the owner or 
occupant, and in connection with some mutual business inter-
est with the occupant or with the latter's own business, is 
called in law :'Tl invitee. You are to determine whether the 
plaintiff Johnsrun was or was not an invitee upon the premises 
and for the use thereof, at the time and place of the happen-
ing of the accident." (Italics added.) 
The court also instructed the jury with respect to the duty 
of a proprietor to a business invitee and then stated, "You 
will note that there are two questions to consider in connec-
tion with whether plaintiff received injuries as a result of lack 
of care on the part of the proprietor or proprietors of said 
building. The first question is with reference to his status 
upon the premises and he must prove that he was an invitee 
in order to establish that he was a person toward whom rea-
sonable care must be exercised." (Italics added.) The jury 
was properly instructed as to the meaning of the requirement 
that the plaintiff must prove the material elements of his case. 
The jury was further instructed "that where without negli-
gence on his part a person is injured while lawfully using an 
entry or passageway upon which he is a business invitee, and 
where such injuries thus received come as a proximate result 
of any negligence on the part of the party charged with the 
maintenance of such entry or passageway, the injured party 
is entitled to recover. 
"Toward an invitee, he who extended the invitation, ex-
press or implied, is obligated to refrain from active negli-
gence and to exercise ordinary care to keep the premises in a 
condition reasonably safe for the invitee in the reasonable 
pursuit of tJ purpose embraced within the invitation." (Italics 
added..) 
The jury was instructed in effect that it was a question of 
fact for it to determine whether plainti1f had a right to oper-
ate the door, i.e., whether plaintiff was lawfully using the 
doorway in the reasonable pursuit of the purpose embraced 
) 
) 
May 1947] JOHNSTON t'. LoNG 
[30 C.2d 54; 181 P.2d 645] 
71 
within the invitation. It was explained to the jury thatplain-
tiffs had alleged "that with the knowledge and acquiesence of 
defendants and for the purpose of making . . . deliveries of 
gasoline he was accustomed to enter the garage building 
through a large overhead lift type of door." The jury was 
instructed that defendant Long denied this and other allega-
tions of plaintiff. They were also told that the codefendant 
planing mill claimed that the automobile company "did not 
at any time, invite the plaintiff or other persons than its own 
servants, employees and agents to use said door, or any ap-
paratus connected therewith .... " 
The instruction requested by defendant Long would have 
presented the last issue more clearly to the jury, but since 
the issues referred to in that instruction were adequately 
presented to the jury in other instructions, it was not error 
to refuse defendant's instruction. 
AJthough tht're was sufficient evidence to sustain a judg-
ment against defendant Long personally, the evidence was 
conflicting, and the question remains whether there were any 
errors committed during the course of the trial that may 
have prejudiced defendant by leading the jury to reach its 
verdict on some ground other than the evidence. Defendant 
contends that the court erred in submitting to the jury a 
form of verdict that was bound to be confusing and in ruling 
on the right to sue defendant as executor after the estate 
was closed, and that the effect of these errors was to cause 
the jurors to believe that by returning a verdict "against 
defendant Ralph C. Long, an individual acting as executor 
of the estate of C. A. Gray, deceased," they were imposing 
a liability upon the defendant that would ultimately be borne 
by the estate and not by Long as an individual. 
[17] The verdict in question was submit.ted to the jury 
at plaintiff's request, and it was the only form of verdict 
submitted with regard to the liability of defendant Long. The 
trial court refused defendant's request to have the verdict 
clarified by the jury. Defendant contends that this was error 
on the ground that the verdict is too vague and uncertain to 
support a judgment against defendant Long. The verdict, 
however, is "against defendant Ralph C. Long" and the 
phrase "an individual acting as executor of the estate of C. A. 
Gray, deceased" is on its face merely descriptive. The ver-
dict may be modified by eliminating this description. (See 
St. Mary's HospitaZ v. Perry, 152 Cal. 338, 340 [92 P. 864]; 
,/ 
) 
72 JOHNSTON 1). LoNG [30C.2d 
Kirchner v. 1IIuller, 280 N.Y. 23, 28 [19 N.E.2d 665, 127 A.L.R. 
681].) [18] Defendant invoked a statement made by the 
foreman of the jury and an afHdavit of another juror, to show 
that the jury understood that the verdict was given against 
Long in his representative capacity. A verdict may be im-
peached by the jury, however, only by a showing that it was 
arrived at by chance. (To0m8s v. Nunes, 24 Cal.App.2d 395, 
399 [75 P.2d 94]; Saltzman v. Sunset Tel. etc. Co., 125 Cal. 
SOl, 505 [58 P. 169]; see 23 Cal.L.Rev. 218.) 
[19] Defendant contends that it is apparent from the 
record that the jurors were confused by the form of the 
verdict and that certain other alleged errors during the 
trial led them to return a verdict in the belief that it was 
against the estate and that liability thereunder would be 
borne by the distributee and not by Long. Defendant's claim 
of prejudice is based on an analogy to the prejudice in-
volved in informing a jury that a defendant in a personal 
injury action carries liability insurance. 
It cannot be disputed that there was considerable confu-
sion on the part of counsel for both parties and on the part 
of the trial judge as to the nature of the liability of an execu-
tor for the torts of an employee of an estate, particularly 
when the estate is closed before the action is brought. It does 
not follow, however, that the confusion was communicated 
to the jury, for most of the discussion of the nature of Long's 
liability occurred in the absence of the jury. 
The theory of plaintift's right to sue Long in a represen-
tative capacity presented at the trial was that although the 
estate had been closed, Long was liable as an individual act-
ing as an executor, a vague status that apparently includes 
his capacity both as an individual and as an executor. It was 
contended that the verdict and judgment should describe 
both capacities because defendant Long had a right of reim-
bursement out of the assets of the estate and that if it was 
error so to describe defendant Long, this court, on appeal, 
should modify the judgment in accord with its view of the 
! law. "We must sue the executor and we must sue him as 
/ an individual but we do not sue him as Long. We sue him 
as Ralph C. Long, the individual, who is the executor." It 
was claimed that this was necessary because "he is not indi-
vidually responsible" and the estate will ultimately have the 
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f;;,u 'nOt presented to the jury, and it cannot therefore be ; 'reued on to show that the jury was prejudiced against 
defendant Long. 
~rot!,; The record indicates, however, that in the presence of the 
. , panel but before any of the prospective jurors were 
~'1l1inplLDellec1, plaintiff'. counsel made certain statements that 
have been made in the jury'. presence. In reply 
queiStiCln by defendant's counsel as to whether plaintiff 
['eODllliderec:l the action against Long as one against him per-
l:ftiorwiAllV. eounse1 for plaintiff stated' that the situation is,. 
sue the executor individually and' that under-
the dictum of the cases that we have, and certainly 
~~lDd4ar the just rule-that obligation of the individual is 
i~nr:lSftlm~ to the estate, eventually." In answer to aques-
the trial court as to whether the plaintiff had at-
E'tamDted to charge the executors (Long and Verheyen) "with 
.~.bi!lity as individuals in a capacity other than as executors 
the EiState" counsel replied that he didn't know. "But 
only trying to say that the business is operated by them 
that under the law we do just what your Honor has 
strange as it might be, we sue them individually because 
are running the business and apparently the circuitous 
'ati'proacb is this: That if they incur this liability, and they 
incurred it not because of any misfeasance of their own, 
'are entitled to recover from the estate." At the time 
IIl"Jttll",,,, statements were made defendant Long made no objec-
that they were prejudicial but merely questioned the 
~i'rEiCtIIless of plaintiff's view of the law that the liability 
directly or indirectly that of the estate. 
pejtenc1aJlt claims that the statements constituted miscon-
COl;LWIlel and urges this alleged misconduct as a ground 
r'j~v4~l'8IILl. having called the trial court's attention to the 
character of the statements in an affldavit in 
of his motion for a new trial. Since defendant 
'DO objection to the statements at the time they were 
'and answered them on their merits, he waived any 
, to claim that they constituted misconduct. If the state-
were prejudicial, defendant should have called the 
cOurt'. attention thereto by a proper objection at the 
they were made, thus giving the trial court an oppor-
to avoid any possible claim of prejudice by diseharg-
jury panel and having the jury selected from a new 
that had not heard the remarks. (See Hicka v. Ocea. 
/ 
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Shore Railroad, Inc., 18 Cal.2d 773, 787 [117 P.2d 8501; 
Estate of Golden, 4 Cal.2d 300, 309 [48 P.2d 962]; cases col-
lected 108 A.L.R. 756, 757.) Nor can defendant rely on these 
statements to show that any error committed during the 
subsequent course of the trial resulted in prejudice. Since 
defendant's counsel was willing at the time to discuss in the 
presence of the jury panel the question of the nature of the 
executor's liability, he contributed to any prejudice that may 
have resulted from this discussion. In any event, this discus-
sion took place 'before the impaneling of the jury, and those 
members of the panel who later became jurors in this ease 
had not yet been advised of the nature of the case they were 
to decide. It is doubtful whether they followed the remarks 
of counsel. Moreover, at the close of the trial, the jurors 
were instructed that they were not to consider any statements 
of counsel occurring during the course of the trial. 
The defendant also contends that the error committed by 
the trial judge in ruling that Long was subject to suit in a 
representative capacity contributed to the alleged confusion 
arising from the form of the verdict. After the jury was 
impaneled and at the commencement of the trial of the case, 
defendant Long objected to the introduction of any testimony 
against him in a representative capacity. The trial court 
overruled the objection. This ruling was made in the jury's 
presence, but there was no discussion at that time of the 
nature of Long's liability. The matter was subsequently dis-
cussed in the absence of the jury, and the trial judge again 
ruled that Long could be used as an executor. The same 
ruling Was made on defendant's motion for a directed ver-
dict. . but the jury was not present and could not have 
been prejudiced by the ruling. 
The only basis for the claim that the rulings in question 
constituted prejudicial error is the fact that after the first 
ruling defendant Long thereafter defended the case in both 
capacities. It is true that this served to call the jury's at-
tention to the fact that defendant Long had been an executor 
of the estate, but obviously it was necessary for the jury to 
be informed of this fact, for the very basis of the case against 
Long was that he had been one of the executors at the time 
the injury occurred. Even if it be assumed that the effect 
of the erroneous ruling of the trial court was to place an 
added and unnecessary burden on defendant Long to de-
fend the ease in a nonexistent capacity, it does not follow 
) 
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that the jury assumed that any judgment against Long 
would have to be paid by the estate that he was supposed to 
represent. If the jury made this assumption it was in the 
face of a clear and correct instruction to the contrary. The 
trial court instructed the jury as follows: "You are further 
instructed that under the laws of the State of California 
no action may be maintained against the estate of C. A. 
Gray or against the defendant. Ralph C. Long, in his ca-
pacity as an Executor of said estate. As to the defendant, 
Long, the action which is submitted to you for determi-
nation is against him as an individual. The two defendants, 
therefore, involved in this action are Ralph C. Long and 
San Diego Planing Mill, a corporation." 
At another point in the instructions the court reminded 
the jurors that they were not concerned with the liability 
of the estate or of Long as an executor. They were informed 
that their attention had been "called to the fact that the 
estate of C. A. Gray, deceased, is not, under the law of this 
state, answerable to the plaintiff in this action. An executor 
of an estate who operates a business is answerable, if at all, 
as an individual." In view of these instructions, it cannot 
be assumed that the jury believed that the judgment was 
against Long in any capacity other than as an individual or 
that any liability that might result from their verdict would 
be borne by anyone but Long. 
Defendant contends, however, that these correct instruc-
tions may not be relied on to sustain the jury's verdict be-
cause the jurors were also instructed that if the codefendant 
planing mill was negligent and this negligence combined 
with the negligence, if any, "of the defendant Ralph C. Long. 
as an individual and executor, to proximately cause said in-
jury . . ., then your verdict will be in favor of the plaintiff 
and against all defendants." This instruction, by itself. might 
be underStood as informing the jury that Long could be 
held liable as an executor and as an individual. but in view of 
the instruction that he could not be sued as an executor and 
that the only defendants involved in the action were Ralph 
C. Long and San Diego Planing Mill, it may not be assumed 
that the jury so interpreted this instruction. When the three 
instructions are considered together, it is apparent that the 
jury was correctly instructed that the two defendants in this 
case were Long as an individual and the codefendant planing 
mill; that neither the estate nor Long as an executor was 
) 
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subject to suit; that if a verdict were returned against Long 
it would be because he was answerable for the accident as an 
individual i and that if the negligence of an employee of the 
planing mill combined with the negligence of an employee 
of the estate to cause the accident. then both Long as an 
individual and the planing mill would be liable. Whether or 
not the confusion among counsel and the trial court as to the 
nature of the tort liability of an executor after his discharge 
was unavoidable. it is apparent from the record that aside 
from the statements of plaintiff's counsel in the presence of 
the jury panel, which were waived by defendant, there was 
nothing presented to the jurors that may be used to show 
that the erroneous ruling and the form of the verdict resulted 
in confusing them to such an extent that they returned a 
verdict based on prejudice rather than upon the evidence 
before them. 
[20] Defendant contends that the jury's verdict award· 
ing plaintiB $87,575 is plainly excessive in view of the fact 
that about $73,000 of that sum constituted general damages. 
The verdict is undoubtedly high. Nevertheless, it is not the 
function of a reviewing court to interfere with a jury's award 
of damagee 1U11ess it ",. 80 grossly disproportionate to any 
reasonable limit of compensation warranted by the factll that 
it shocks the court's sense of justice and raises a presumption 
that it was the result of passion and prejudice. (Z",'bbeZZ v. 
8outh6na Pacific 00., 160 Cal. 237. 255 rU6 P. 5131.) The 
amount of the verdict must be viewed. in the light of the 
evidence before the trial court. (Zibb6ll v. 80uthern PlJCifiic 
00., IUpt'CI, at 254.) The trW court. in denying a motion for 
new trial, found that the verdict was not excessive. This 
decision lends weight to the jury's award. (Birifl,ger v. 81JCr(J-
"""to Lodge No.6, 187 Cal. 578. 585 [203 P. 768]; Me-
8weeMfI v. EMf BtJfI TraMt 00., 60 Cal.App.2d 807. 814 
[141 P.2d 787}.) There is considerable support in the evi· 
dence for the trial court's approval of the amount awarded. 
It would aeeomplish no purpose to recite all the evidence 
relating to plaintitf'8 injuries. It may be noted, however, 
that for a period of over four years he has undergone thirty· 
one operations for the purpose of alleviating bis disfigure-
ment and he faces additional operations. The accident reno 
dered him 80 un.crightly that it would be unreasonable to expect 
him to forego restorative surgery. His doctors were highly 
quali1ied in plastic surgery, and thq wormed the tarT .~ 
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length of the steps already taken to repair, in slight measure, 
the damage to his appearance. The operations were compli-
cated and painful. Many of the operations consisted of the 
raising of pedicles from various parts of his body and attach-
ing them first to parts of his face and then to his nose. This 
procedure was repeatedly unsuccessful, each attempt requir-
ing new removals of substantial amounts of skin and flesh. 
For over four years plaintiff has spent a large part of his 
time in the hospital. It is difficult t.o predict how many re-
maining operations may be necessary. 
Defendant concede.q that plaintiff is "very considerably 
disfigured" and the likelihood is that he always will be. Since 
plaintiff is a salesman a.q well as a truck driver, ,he has suf-
fered a substantial loss in earning capacity. A reviewing 
court does not ordinarily substitute its judgment for that 
of the jury and trial court, which have evaluated in terms 
of damages the pain, humiliation. disfigurement, and loss of 
earning capacity suffered by a plaintiff. (Kelley v. Hodge 
Transportation System, 197 Cal. 598, 610 T242 P. 76].) In 
view of the extensive testimony concerning plaintiff's medi-
cal history and the uncertainty of his future restoration, 
we conclude that the trial court did not err in its refusal 
to grant a new trial or to reduce the award on the ground 
of excessive damages. 
Defendant, in reliance upon Karr v. Parks, 44 Cal. 46, 
also contends that the cost of plastic surgery was' improp-
erly allowed as a measure of damages. In the Karl' case, 
decided in 1872. plaintiff sued to recover for services ren-
dered and expenses incurred in the cure of wounds in-
flicted upon his infant daughter. Much of the expense was 
the result of surgical treatment for the removal of an un-
sightly disfigurement caused by the injury. This court held 
that any restoration undertaken by plaintiff was voluntary 
and could not be an element of damages in an action on 
his behalf. There were indications in the ease that the in-
fant had previously optained a recovery based on the con-
tinuance of her deformity. 
Any expressions in the Karl' case to the e1Iect that an in-
jured party is not entitled to damages in the form of ex-
penses incurred for restorative surgery made necessary by 
the negligence of defendant must be disapproved. (See Rest., 
Torts, § 924(c).) Present day standards no longer regard 
plastic surgery as a strange or foreign art. Indeed, there may 
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be occasions when an injured person would be required to 
undergo plastic surgery to mitagate damages. (Goodwin v. 
Giovenelli, 117 Conn. 103 [167 A. 87J.) In the present case 
it was essential for plaintiff to undergo some restorative 
surgery because of the impairment of his breathing caused 
by the accident. It was also necessary to take steps to ex-
pedite the healing of the wound, which was retarded by a 
lack of blood supply to the injured member. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., and Carter, J., concurred. 
EDMONDS, J.-As 1 read the record, the form of the 
verdict, combined with the erroneous rulings requiring Long 
to defend as executor, was bound to lead to confusion and 
undoubtedly gave the jury the impression that the judgment 
would ultimately be paid by the estate and not by him. 
I agree that the court could modify the verdict by regard-
ing certain terms as descriptive, but it is quite certain that 
the jury did not so regard them. This verdict may not be 
impeached, but when its form is considered in connection 
with the other errors throughout the trial, there iR a clear 
record showing that, although it read against Long. in effect, 
the jurors believed it to be an award of damageR against 
the estate for which Long would be indemnified. 
The statements of plaintiff'R counsel. made in the presence 
of the jury, that the liability was directly or indirectly that 
of the estate, should not be disregarded in determining 
whether the other errors committed during the course of the 
trial were prejudicial. At the time those statement. 'I were 
made, the trial judge had not yet ruled upon the question &..'1 
to whether Long was properly sued in his representative 
capacity. Shortly thereafter, Long objected to the introduc-
tion of any testimony against him in a representative ca-
pacity. The objection was overruled in the presencee of the 
jury. Subsequently, the matter was argued by counsel in the 
absence of the jury. Long then called attention to the preju-
dicial effect of a ruling requiring him to defend before the 
jury in the dual capacity of an individual and an executor. 
But the court decided that he could be sued 88 an executor, 
evidently upon the theory of his ability in some form of 
"individual representative capacity." This is evident from 
the trial judge's statement that, although probably the estate 
W88 not liable, Long could be sued 88 an executor aDd should 
-) 
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be described as an individual and as an executor in order 
to protect any right of recovery out of the assets of the estate. 
This discussion did not take place in the jurors' presence, but 
they were aware of the ruling upon the motion to the effect 
that Long was properly sued as an executor. The effect of 
this erroneous ruling was to force Long to defend as executor. 
The prejudicial effect of these errors, according to thc 
. plaintiff, was cured by a correct instruction that no action 
, could be maintained against the estate or against Long in 
his capacity as executor and that Long was liable only per-
sonally. The effect of that instnlction must be considered, 
. however. in connection with the directly contrary rulings of 
,the trial court. The jurors knew that the suit was prosecuted 
'against Long in his capacity a.~ an executor and he had de-
fended in that capacity. The instruction is entirely incon-
'sistent with the only form of verdict submitted to the jury 
providing for a recovery against Long. Moreover, the in-
'&tructions themselves were inconsistent, for the court also 
instructed the jury that if the codefendant planing mill 
:Wa,s negligent. and its negligence combined with the negli-
'gence, if any, "of the defendant Ralph C. Long, as an in-
'dividual and executor, to proximately cause said injury . . ., 
then your verdict will be in favor of the plaintiff and against 
" "all defendants." 
it was necessary for the jury to be in-
Itformed of Long's service as an executor of the Gray estate, 
there is no basis for an assumption, from that fact 
that the executor would have a right of indemnity, 
o~ that the liability was directly or indirectly that of the 
estate. Nor was it necessary to submit to the jury a con-
. form of verdict. 
plaintiff takes the position that the errors were un-
v .... , .. /J.,,, because of the unsettled state of the law on the 
of an executor. The basis of his contention is that 
_:n""1:n,\1' the plaintiff nor the trial judge knew the nature of 
executor's liability after the estate was closed because 
question has not previously been decided by this court. 
_Kn· ...... '.,. ..... the unsettled state of the law on any point which 
the plaintiff and caused the trial court to com-
does not preclude Long from complaining of the 
E'1>re;juolici:al effect of that error. 
M(llreclve,r. even if it be assumed that the question of the 
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so unsettled that it could not be determined by a trial court 
and was properly left for initial determination on appeal, 
there was no necessity to submit to the jury a form of verdict 
that, together with the ruling of the trial court, would reason-
ably be understood by the jury as imposing some form of 
liability against the estate. The least that could have been 
done to mitigate the confusion and prejudice in the minds of 
the jurors was to submit to them a verdict that could be 
understood only as imposing liability against the executor 
personally. Certainly the jury could have been instructed, 
clearly and without conflict, that any award of damages 
against Long was his personal obligation and not that of 
the estate, either directly or indirectly. In that event, if it 
were later determined upon appeal that the liability could 
be imposed against the estate, no prejudice would have re-
sulted to the plaintiff, because the ability to pay a judgment 
has no relation to the question as to who is at fault. 
The prejudicial character of the errors in this case is 
analogous to the prejudice involved in allowing a jury to be 
informed that a defendant in a personal injury action carries 
liability insurance. {Schlenker v. Egloff, 133 Cal.App. 393, 
398 [24 P.2d 224J; see Pierce v. United Gas ~ Electric Co., 
161 Cal.' 176, 188 [118 P. 700]; cases collected. 56 A.L.R. 
1418; 105 A.L.R. 1319.} There is the same probability that 
the jury would be more inclined to find a verdict against 
Long if it believed he would be indemnified than if it under-
stood that he would have to bear the burden alone. (See 
Brown v. Yocum, 113 Cal.App. 621, 625 [298 P. 845].) Al-
though there was no showing of bad faith, the errors, in SI) 
far as they impressed the jury with the idea that the judg-
ment against Long would be paid by the estate, were preju-
dicial and ground for reversal, because the question of de-
fendant's responsibility was so close that a verdict in his 
favor would have been at least equally reasonable (see Citti 
v. Ba1Ja, 204 Cal. 136, 139 [266 P. 954]; Schlenker v. Egloff, 
supra), and there is every reason to believe that the errors 
substantially influenced the result. 
It is contended that the errors were not prejudicial upon 
the ground that the distributee will ultimately have to pay 
the judgment, because plaintiff concedes that the record 
shows no personal negligence of Long. Obviously, the dis-
tributee is not bound by the plaintiff's concession. It was 
not necessarily to the interest of either the plaintiff or Long 
to show personal negligence, and it eaDDOt be awame1 that 
\ } 
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the evidence in litigation to which the distributee was a 
party would not show that Long, as executor, was personally 
at fault, or that he violated some duty to the heirs that would 
foreclose any right of indemnity. Also, since the distributee 
is not a party to this appeal, the question of Long's right of 
indemnity against the distributee cannot now be determined. 
For these reasons, in my opinion, the judgment should 
be reversed. 
Spence, J., I concurred. 
SCHAUER, J.-I dissent. In liberal construction of sec-
tion 572 of the Probate Code I would hold that in such a case 
as this the executor should be liable exclusively in his repre-
sentative capacity. When an executor conducts the business 
of an estate under authorization of the court and the Pro-
bate Code he is not personally liable for the contract debts 
and obligations incurred in carrying on such business. No 
more, I think, should he, in the absence of personal fault, 
be personally liable for torts of estate employees. His actions 
.in the premises are purely in the capacity of executor. The 
employee whose fault causes the injury to another is not the 
employee of the executor personally. He is the employee of 
the executor only in the latter's representative status. The 
doctrine of respondeat superior, then, should pass the bur-
den on to the real employer, to the executor in his represen-
tative capacity but not against him otherwise. 
It is asserted that the law which holds that an officer of a 
corporation is not liable under the doctrine of respondeat 
Buperior for the torts of corporate employees except where the 
officer is at fault, cannot be applied to executors; that the 
corporate employee's liability can be related directly to the 
corporation because the latter is an entity and can be sued, 
but that the estate of a decedent is not an entity and cannot 
be sued. I do not find this proposition persuasive. If the 
estate of a decedent is enough of an entity to carry on a busi-
ness, to contract and pay debts, and realize profits and losses, 
it should be enough of an entity to be sued. In fact the books 
are replete with cases in which estates, acting through the 
executors or administrators, have sued and been sued. The 
Probate Code (see §§ 572, 573 et seq. and Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 369) certainly authorizes such proceedings in relation to 
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causes ex contractu. The question here is: Is this par-
ticular tort action authorized as against the executor in 
his official capacity t 
Section 572 (Prob. Code) declares that "the court may 
authorize the executor . . . to continue the operation of the 
decedent's business to such an extent and subject to such 
restrictions as may seem to the court to be for the best 
interest of the estate and those interested therein." The 
operation of a business ordinarily includes participation as 
a party plaintiff or defendant in such litigation as may 
arise from normal conduct of the business. Tort actions 
are not abnormal in the conduct of a business. Surely it 
cannot be seriously asserted that a business such as that 
here involved could be carried on for extended periods 
without the definite possibility of tortious conduct of some em-
ployee; human experience demonstrates the contrary. 
Of course, it is not intimated that the court in authoriz-
ing the conduct of the business intended to authorize the 
commission of torts by employees. But the application of 
the doctrine of respondeat superior does not depend on ex-
press or intentional authorization of tortious conduct. (16 
Cal.Jur 1101-1102, § 61.) 
It seems to me that the declaration in the majority opinion 
that "If section 572 has any effect on the question of tort 
liability of the estate, the purpose of that section as well asl 
the purpose of any authorization in the will for the carrying! 
on of the business may be fully carried out by applying th 
rules of the Restatement of Trusts in regard to such liabili 
[personal on the trustee] as well as the representative'R righ 
of reimbursement out of the assets of the estate" is thor 
oughly unrealistic, unwarranted and impractical. If it is 
be recognized that the liability is ultimately and in justic 
that of the estate, then that liability should be impose 
directly on the estate rather than through the round-aOOu 
method espoused in the opinion. The opinion says, in effect 
that the nonnegligent executor is personally liable in legal' 
istic form but not in actual substance because he may ulti 
mately recover from the estate. Such method must inevitabl 
tend to multiply litigation and often may result in leavin 
a nonnegligent executor with the &etuality as well as the 
form of personal liability. 
Section 572 (Prob. Code) in its present substance is be-
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on this open question, evolve a construction which seems so 
certain to produce multiplicity of suits, delays in final set-
tlement of estates, and, at least occasionally, admittedly un-
just actual responsibility, all stemming from the unrealistic 
concept that authorization to an executor to conduct a busi-
ness in his official capacity does not carry with it authoriza-
tion to sue or be sued in the same capacity in respect to torts 
committed in doing the very thing authorized. 
The judgment in this case, as well as the verdict upon 
which it is based, is in such form and substance as to war-
rant its construction as running against the defendant Long 
solely as executor of the estate. So construed the judgment 
could well be affirmed unless precluded by the facts that Long 
had been discharged as executor and the estate proceedings 
closed, and not reopened, prior to institution of the action. 
The questions which would arise as to the competence of 
Long to defend as executor without reopening the probate 
proceedings, and as to the validity and enforceability of the 
judgment, if construed as suggested, I do not here reach be-
cause discussion thereof, in view of the majority holding, 
would be academic at this stage. The majority opinion con-
strues the judgment as running against Mr. Long personally 
and as so construed affirms it. In my view it should be con-
strued, and can properly be affirmed if at all, only as against 
Mr. Long as executor of the estate. If it cannot be affirmed 
against him in his representative capacity then it should be 
reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings. 
Hence, regardless of what conclusion might be reached as 
to Mr. Long's capacity t.o defend as executor and as to the 
validity and enforceability of the judgment if construed to 
bind him only in his representative capacity, I am compelled 
to dissent from the majority's judgment and opinion. 
A ppellants' petition for a rehearing was denied June 4, 
1947. and the opinion was modified to read as above. Ed-
monds, J_, Schauer, J., and Spence, J., voted for a rehearing. 
